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Victims of Circumstance: 
The Execution of German Deserters by 
Surrendered German Troops Under Canadian 
Control in Amsterdam, May 1945 
Chris Madsen 
Introduction 
On the morning of 13 May 1945, five days after the formal capitulation of Hitler's 
Wehrmacht, a German military court delivered 
death sentences on two German naval 
deserters, Bruno Dorfer and Rainer Beck. The 
trial occurred in an abandoned Ford assembly 
plant on the outskirts of Amsterdam, a site 
used by the Canadian army for the 
concentration of German naval personneL Later 
that same day, a German firing squad, supplied 
with captured German rifles and a three-ton 
truck from the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada 
and escorted by Canadian Captain Robert K. 
Swinton, executed the two German prisoners 
of war a short distance outside the enclosure. 1 
Dorfer and Beck were among the last victims of 
a military legal system distorted by the Nazi 
state. At the time no one, Canadian or German, 
questioned the justice of the event. 
This tragic incident demonstrated a 
disturbing degree of cooperation between 
Canadian military units and the defeated 
German military. Why did German deserters 
like Dorfer and Beck continue to die after the 
end of the war? The executions were a matter 
of convenience. The Canadian military allowed 
the German military structure to function after 
the capitulation. Under this questionable 
arrangement, the German armed forces in 
Holland disarmed, concentrated, and evacuated 
themselves. To accomplish this gigantic task 
in an orderly and disciplined way, Canadian 
military authorities mistakenly relied on the 
vanquished German military leadership. 
German commanders and military judges 
continued to apply an irregular military law 
against deserters; and Canadian restrictions 
on these actions remained limited and hesitant. 
In this situation, larger political and strategic 
considerations worked against deserters like 
Dorfer and Beck. Canadian reactions, during 
and twenty-one years after the execution, 
reflected a sad record of indifference and 
callousness for these unfortunate victims of 
latent Nazism. 
Background 
T he strategic situation in North-West Europe became quite curious at the end of 
the Second World War. Canadian and British 
advances into the Netherlands and Germany 
effectively cut off German military forces in 
Western Holland. 2 The Twenty-Fifth German 
Army, under the command of Generaloberst 
Johannes von Blaskowitz. retreated into a 
fortified area between the Maas and Waal 
Rivers in the south and the Grebbe Line in the 
east. This "Festung Holland" contained 
approximately 150,000 German soldiers.3 A 
composite garrison of German army and naval 
formations awaited the final collapse of the 
German armed forces. The German military's 
threat to destroy Holland's extensive dyke 
systems and flood the fertile countryside 
prevented further advances of Canadian 
military units. 4 Consequently, battle-lines in 
the Netherlands remained relatively constant. 
These conditions provided a basis for agreement 
between Canadian and German military 
leadership. On 28 April 1945. Lieutenant-
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The surrender of German forces in the Netherlands, I Canadian Corps HQ, 5 May 1945. 
General Charles Foulkes, commander of I 
Canadian Corps, and Blaskowitz concluded a 
makeshift armistice for feeding the Dutch 
civilian population. Under Operation "Faust," 
Canadian truck convoys drove through German 
lines, merchant ships sailed for major Dutch 
ports, and Allied bombers dropped food rations. 5 
In this way, the First Canadian Army, under 
General Harry Crerar, began an enduring 
working relationship with the German military 
administration in Holland. On 5 May 1945, 
Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, 
commander of the 21st British Army Group, 
accepted from Generaladmiral Hans Georg von 
Friede burg "the surrender of all German forces 
in Holland, in northwest Germany including 
the Frisian Islands, and Heligoland and all 
other islands, in Schleswig-Holstein, and in 
Denmark. "6 At the small town ofWageningen, 
94 
(Photo: Alex M. Stirton, NAC PA 133321) 
Crerar, through Foulkes, issued detailed 
instructions to Blaskowitz for implementation 
of this surrender in the Netherlands. The 
document made the German general 
responsible "for all GERMAN Armed Forces 
(including German Navy, Army, Air Forces), 
auxiliaries and civilians"7 within Blaskowitz's 
sphere of control. Meanwhile, the signing of 
the unconditional surrender by German 
plenipotentiaries at Rheims on 7 May 1945, to 
take effect the next day, formally ended the 
Third Reich. 
By the time of the final capitulation, 
Canadian military forces were not yet inside 
German-occupied Holland. At 2300 hours on 
7 May 1945, the Seaforth Highlanders of 
Canada, a regiment of the 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division, received orders to proceed forward: 
2
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"Instead of going to HAARLEM we are now to go 
to AMSTERDAM and will be the first unit to 
travel into the newly liberated area. "8 During 
the next few days, Canadian military units 
slowly moved towards designated occupation 
zones within Holland. Enthusiastic Dutch 
crowds swamped Canadian columns at every 
crossroad along inward routes. Lieutenant-
Colonel H.P. Bell-Irving, the commander of the 
Seaforth Highlanders, described the Canadian 
entry into Amsterdam: 
The universal happiness amounted to an ecstasy 
which I have never seen even approached in any 
crowd before. Before this, few of our men could have 
given a clear reason why they came ... But here in 
Amsterdam, in one day, all that was changed ... 
Every life lost. every long day away from home, had 
been spent in a good and necessary endeavour. 9 
The Dutch population greeted Canadian 
soldiers as liberators; Holland was once again 
a free country. The arrival of Canadian military 
forces officially ended five long years of German 
rule. 
Nevertheless, the German military remained 
a potent force within Holland. The Germans 
still controlled large sections of the Dutch 
administrative, communication, and 
transportation infrastructures. Many Dutch 
civilians "could not understand, during the 
first few days, a situation where armed 
Canadian soldiers were going up one side of the 
road and armed Germans going down the other 
side, neither interfering with the other. "10 
German military formations carried on with 
regular duties under the surrender agreement. 
Until further Canadian instructions, 
Blaskowitz's headquarters remained 
"responsible for the maintenance and discipline 
ofallGermantroopsinWESTERNHOLLAND."11 
At times, the vengeful activities of Nederlandse 
Binnenlandse Strydkrachten (NBS), or Dutch 
Interior Forces, impinged on this practical 
arrangement. The Canadians found "a country 
whose friendly people and resistance forces are 
lusting to see the last of the Germans." 12 
Anything German became a target; the NBS 
Disarmed German soldiers move towards concentration areas. 
(Piwto: Alex M. Stirton/NAC PA 151928) 
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declared open season on German soldiers found 
alone on Amsterdam streets. Thus, the 
Germans gained safety in numbers, and 
retained weapons for protection: "There was 
some trouble in the "D" Company sector of the 
town-some Dutch got into a boat and 
attempted to shoot up a German concentration 
area. The fire was returned by the Germans. "13 
Sporadic outbursts of violence erupted between 
the two heavily armed groups. The German 
military structure therefore represented an 
element of order in a potentially explosive and 
chaotic situation. 
Concentration 
A major priority of Canadian military units in Amsterdam was the disarming and 
concentration of German military personnel. 
On 11 May 1945, "D" Company of the Seaforth 
Highlanders "moved from the MONTESSORI 
School, MRE041205 to the Ford Factory at 
MRE013286 to control the concentration of 
German Marines." 14 The Canadian company 
established an administrative headquarters at 
this large abandoned factory across from the 
town ofZaandam. The location was well suited 
for gathering extensive German naval forces in 
the area. However, Field Marshal Montgomery, 
in his memoirs, articulated the dilemma 
confronting many Canadian and British soldiers 
under his command: "I was a soldier and I had 
not been trained to handle anything of this 
nature." 15 Canadian combat units, who had 
fought and killed German soldiers on 
battlefields only a week previously, now fulfilled 
a very different role. Men of the Seaforth 
Highlanders, veterans of the Italian campaign 
and the drive into the Netherlands, embarked 
on temporary wartime careers as prison camp 
wardens. 16 The work was tedious and 
exceedingly unpopular. A Canadian officer 
commented on the enormity of the task: "Here 
they were, one Canadian battalion set down in 
the midst ofthousands of Germans whom they 
had to locate, guard, escort, and disarm." 17 
Initially, the sheer scale of surrender appeared 
overwhelming. Canadian military units, 
handicapped by limited occupation experience 
and finite resources, coped with a complicated 
situation. 
96 
However, the cooperation and organization 
of the German military greatly aided Canadian 
efforts. For the most part, German military 
formations remained intact and functional. At 
Julianadorp, the Germans "marched in fully 
armed, wheeled into the airfield along one road 
and halted." 18 Canadian soldiers merely 
collected and stacked German weapons. 
German war material was sorted, stored, and 
guarded, pending final destruction or 
distribution to Allied military and civil sources. 19 
In many instances, German military formations 
disarmed themselves, and moved unescorted 
towards selected Canadian prison camps and 
concentration areas. Canadian military units 
and the NBS secured ammunition dumps and 
munitions storage areas left behind by German 
military forces inAmsterdam. 20 Thus, German 
assistance became indispensable in disarming 
and concentrating German troops. Canadian 
military authorities directly benefitted from 
the continuation of German military structures. 
An unprecedented Allied alteration in the 
application of international law allowed this 
peculiar state of affairs. The Canadian military 
held surrendered German soldiers, not as 
prisoners of war, but as capitulated troops 
under the designation "Surrendered Enemy 
Personnel [SEP]": 
in view of the very large numbers of GERMAN troops 
now surrendering ARMY COMMANDS are authorized 
to place such troops in the status of "Disarmed 
GERMAN Forces" as contemplated by paragraph 
2"C" and other pertinent paragraphs of ECLIPSE 
memorandum No 1 7. Under provisions ofthe foregoing 
memorandum these GERMAN forces will NOT be 
characterized as "PRISONERS OF WAR". After 
disarmament these surrendered German units may 
be kept organizationally intact and to the extent 
deemed advisable and practicable by ALLIED 
COMMANDERS required to administer and maintain 
themselves. 21 
The First Canadian Army implemented 
Operation "Eclipse," a pre-arranged plan for 
the occupation of Germany and demobilization 
ofthe German armed forces. The scheme made 
the vanquished German military completely 
self-sufficient and reliant on existing German 
food stocks.22 Thus, theWestemAllieswithheld 
prisoner of war status because the enormous 
number of surrendered German soldiers 
exceeded Allied food and manpower resources. 
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Despite these practical justifications, the 
SEP classification possessed a very doubtful 
existence under international law. General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe, informed Canadian 
officials that "there should be no, repeat no, 
public declaration regarding status of German 
armed forces or of disarmed troops."23 As 
Eisenhower knew, the SEP label stretched the 
bounds of international law pertaining to 
prisoners of war. Article 1 of the 1929 Geneva 
from all or any of the personnel of the German 
armed forces the status of Prisoners ofWar."26 
Such arbitrary power on the part of a detaining 
power contradicted the entire humanitarian 
spirit and purpose behind the 1929 Geneva 
Convention. Moreover, the Allied claim that a 
legitimate German government no longer 
existed seemed equally tenuous. The Allies 
dissolved the acting government of 
Grossadmiral Karl D6nitz on 23 May 1945.27 
Germany, as a signatory to the 1929 Geneva 
Gennan and Canadian sentries guard the entrance to the .ijmuiden Concentration area. 
Convention clearly conferred prisoner of war 
status on "all persons belonging to the armed 
forces of belligerent parties, captured by the 
enemy in the course of military operations."24 
Hence, the Allied distinction between the words 
"captured" and "surrendered" in application of 
the convention represented a very weak legal 
argument. Protection under the 1929 Geneva 
Convention was not limitable.25 In the eyes of 
international law, surrendered German troops 
were prisoners of war. Nevertheless, the First 
Canadian Army in Holland maintained 
"unfettered discretion to impose on or withhold 
(NAC PA 134396) 
Convention, still benefitted from the dictates of 
international law until at least this later date. 
Thus, Canadian military authorities assigned 
a questionab 2le legal status to surrendered 
German troops in Holland. 
Nonetheless, the arrangement between the 
Canadian army and the German armed forces 
worked exceedingly well. For the most part, 
the Canadians operated directly through the 
existing German military hierarchy. The First 
Canadian Corps established a control section 
within the compound of the Twenty-Fifth 
97 
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German Army Headquarters "to act as the filter 
through which the German Army Commander 
passes his orders to his subordinate 
formations." 28 The efficient staff work of the 
Germans impressed many Canadian observers. 
Additionally, Canadian military authorities left 
the German military in control of their own 
signals and communication network. 29 Direct 
telephone links kept various Canadian and 
German headquarters informed. The telephone 
allowed the quick and easy passage of orders; 
if needed, written orders were translated into 
both English and German. Periodically, the 
Canadians reminded the German military who 
was in charge: 
GO 500 Restricted. From Lt. General Foulkes for 
Colonel-General Blaskowitz. Colonel-General 
BLASKOWITZ will not repeat not visit formation 
Headquarters or units of German army, air force or 
navy without permission of the General officer 
commanding 1 Canadian Corps. The request of 
Colonel-General Blaskowitz to visit formations 11 
May is NOT repeat NOT granted all information.30 
Despite minor restrictions and limitations, 
the German military retained an amazing degree 
of authority for a defeated army. Each 
concentration area or camp possessed a 
German commander in contact with higher 
German authorities. At the factory occupied 
by the Seaforth Highlanders, Fregattenkapitan 
Alexander Stein, the German harbour 
commander in Amsterdam, managed 
incarcerated naval personnel. 31 A parallel 
German leadership existed beside the Canadian 
military hierarchy. German troops in Holland 
maintained, with Canadian approval, allegiance 
to the larger German armed forces. 
Canadian military units, however, 
frequently encountered a different kind of 
German soldier. Concentration sweeps 
discovered a growing number of deserters from 
the German armed forces. Sometime in the 
past, these men had rejected German uniforms 
and the cause oftheThird Reich. The Western 
Allies were partly responsible for the German 
desertion problem. During the course of the 
war, a Psychological Warfare Division within 
SHAEF had actively sought the disintegration 
and collapse of the German armed forces. 32 
Special Allied propaganda teams undermined 
Wehrmacht morale through various means of 
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persuasion. A propaganda leaflet, dropped 
behind German lines by Allied planes in late 
1944 and early 1945, bore the clever caption: 
"Attacked from the front. Cut off from behind. 
Written off by Hitler. "33 Canada, Great Britain, 
and the United States promised safe conduct 
and good treatment to any potential German 
deserters. These Allied appeals openly incited 
desertion. 
Nevertheless, the number of desertions 
from the German armed forces, although on a 
steady increase until the end of the war, 
remained relatively modest. For February 
1944, the last month of accurate German 
military legal records, the German military 
tried only 2,098 German soldiers or 
approximately 19.6 soldiers per 100,000 men 
for desertion in the entire German armed 
forces. 34 Statistics reveal that German military 
institutions retained a cohesive character. Most 
German deserters left their units for a mixture 
of social and personal reasons. 35 
Paradoxically, the Canadian army, which 
had promoted disintegration during the war, 
now took a dimmer view towards German 
deserters. The act of desertion suffered from a 
double-standard; armies actively sought 
desertion in enemy armed forces, but frowned 
upon desertion among troops under their own 
control.36 Disciplined German military units 
now played an integral part in Canadian 
concentration and occupation activities within 
Holland. Thus, deserters threatened helpful 
and necessary cohesion. 
On 12 May 1945, an NBS detachment 
issued a typed receipt for the transfer of six 
German deserters to Canadian military 
authorities. 37 Dutch administrators, militia 
forces, and police often found German deserters 
hiding within the large city of Amsterdam. 
However, a war diary entry from 1st Canadian 
Infantry Division disclosed the ultimate fate of 
these men and other deserters: 
With the sanction of our Headquarters the Germans 
shot a half dozen of their deserters who had been 
tried by German Court Martial. 2 Canadian Infantry 
Brigade reported that NBS have picked up 12 more 
German deserters in the jails of Rotterdam. They 
were turned over to German Commander in the 
concentration area at Ijmuiden. 38 
6




Canadian military authorities, although 
clearly able to assign or withhold prisoner of 
war status for any German soldier, chose an 
easier course. Canadian military units 
repatriated deserters back to the German 
military. Punishment for repudiation of German 
military discipline awaited many unfortunate 
men. 39 Desertion remained a concern for 
German commanders; Canadian military 
authorities adopted a strict policy of non-
interference in German affairs. This pattern 
decided the final destiny of Bruno Dorfer and 
Rainer Beck. 
Trial 
T wenty-year old Dorfer and twenty-eight-year old Beck felt deceptively safe after the 
final German surrender. The welcome news 
ended long periods of concealment and fears of 
discovery. On 5 September 1944, 
Maschinenmaat Beck had deserted from a 
harbour defence unit at Ijmuiden, and entered 
into hiding with his sister, Fredegund, in 
Amsterdam; similarly, Funk-Gefreiter Dorfer, 
sheltered by an aunt, Johanna Timmermanns, 
had left the Ninth Mine-Sweeping Flotilla during 
the last days of the war. 40 Beck perhaps 
maintained the strongest reasons for rejecting 
German military institutions. From Hitler's 
ascendency to power in 1933, the Nazi regime 
had persecuted his family. The reasons were 
obvious: Beck's mother was Jewish, and his 
father, Max Emil Beck, a decorated World War 
I veteran, was compromised by a position as 
Social Democratic police president of Gleiwitz 
during the Weimar RepublicY When Beck was 
drafted into the Kriegsmarine in 1940, he 
already possessed an overt hostility and 
contempt for the National Socialist state. Upon 
meeting his fugitive sister in 1941, the young 
man despondently declared: "If I wear the 
German uniform I am a bastard. Ifl don't wear 
it, I am a bastard just the same."42 Strong anti-
Nazi views dictated Beck's eventual departure 
from the German armed forces. The arrival of 
Canadian soldiers in Amsterdam seemingly 
promised a new beginning from a dreadful 
past. Beck and Dorfer, wearing civilian clothes, 
sought out nearby Canadian military units. 
However, the pair met an unexpected 
reception. On 12 May 1945, the Dutch 
underground brought Dorfer and Beck to the 
Seaforth Highlanders' detention camp. Major 
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Canadian regiment, ordered Major J. Dennis 
Pierce, the company commander in charge of 
the former factory, to place the two deserters 
inside the compound because "they were 
certainly Germans and we had no other place 
to put them."43 Initially, Stein and the internal 
German military leadership refused acceptance 
of Dorfer and Beck. The Germans argued that 
the camp was no place for deserters and traitors. 
Pierce, after an argument with the German 
interpreter, a Kapitdnleutnant and former E-
boat officer named Hoslinger, "finally put the 
two youngsters in the office of the plant manager 
under guard of a German non-commissioned 
officer. "44 Canadian soldiers fed Dorfer and 
Beck, and periodically checked on the pair's 
safety during the night. Pierce's decision 
apparently offered a compromise solution to 
the impasse. 
In the morning, Fregattenkapitdn Stein 
proposed a very different settlement. At 1005 
hours on 13 May 1945, Pierce informed 2 
Canadian Infantry Brigade of the intended 
German course of action: "German Marine 
deserters being tried this morning. German 
Commander intends [to] shoot them."45 The 
German camp leadership established a 
Standgericht or a court martial within the 
camp. This judicial body would determine 
guilt or innocence. Nevertheless, as mentioned 
in the above message, Pierce and the Canadian 
camp staff believed that Stein had already 
decided on a verdict before the trial began. 
Consequently, the court martial adopted a 
mixture of exhibition and formality. The 
German camp leadership brought Dorfer and 
Beck before three officers, a team of military 
lawyers "whom Pierce himself had "put in the 
bag" in the streets of Amsterdam earlier in the 
week."46 Stein regarded the proceedings as a 
show trial for his authority. At the insistence 
of the German naval commander, the entire 
camp population witnessed the event. A parade 
state, taken earlier that morning, counted 1,817 
German marines inside the camp. 47 The two 
accused, represented by a German military 
lawyer, underwent rigorous cross-examination 
before this large staring crowd. Marineober-
stabsrichters der Reserve Wilhelm Kahn, a 
presiding judge, questioned first Dorfer, and 
100 
then Beck, on conditions of service, on 
circumstances and events behind the 
desertions, and about any resistance activities 
since the initial offenses. Oberleutnantlnginieur 
Frank Trmal, a young German officer present 
at the fifteen-minute trial, remembered Beck's 
defence: 
For some reason Beck. who was older decided to 
defend himself and told the court that we (the 
Germans) all knew several weeks ago the war was all 
over for us and that it was a matter of time before we 
surrendered. He told the captain and the court that 
any further fighting by us against the Canadians 
would be senseless bloodshed. With this the captain 
jumped to his feet in a rage, screaming at Beck that 
he was calling all of us, his comrades, and his 
officers, murderers. It is something that I will never 
forget. 48 
Any hopes of restraint and moderation 
faded as the mood of the court turned uglier. 
The defence lawyer's final plea of leniency fell 
on deaf ears. After a short discussion, the 
three military judges delivered death sentences 
on Dorfer and Beck. 
The operation and outcome of this court 
martial was consistent with the development 
of German military law during the National 
Socialist years and the Second World War. The 
trial represented a "kangaroo court" only in the 
context that the entire German military legal 
system had evolved into a tyrannical 
instrument. 49 According to German historian 
Manfred Messerschmidt, German military 
judges, convinced by"stab in the back" illusions 
from World War I and influenced by Nazi 
ideology, turned away from accepted liberal 
concepts of law and justice. The idea of a 
Volksgemeinschcift, a unity of the German 
people under the Nazi state, increasingly took 
precedence over notions of personal guilt and 
individual responsibility. 50 As a result, German 
military law elevated offenses, previously 
considered infractions against military 
discipline, to the status of political crimes. 
Desertion and the unique charge of 
Wehrkrciftzersetzung (attempting to subvert 
the will of the people to fight) became two major 
offenses in the Wehrmacht. 51 German military 
judges, mimicking the FUhrer, stressed 
solidarity, fighting effectiveness, morale, and 
the common good of the German people. 
8
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German soldiers guarding food dump established to feed the Dutch population. 
The application of German military law 
against cases of desertion reflected this 
emphasis. The Militdrstrajgesetzbuch (MStGB), 
a revised military criminal code introduced on 
10 October 1940, established stronger 
punishments for desertion: 
§ 70 
Punishment for Desertion 
1. The punishment for desertion is imprisonment 
not less than six months. 
(Photo by Alex M. Stirton. NAC PA 134415) 
2. If the offence is committed in the field or in an 
especially difficult case, the death penalty or lifetime 
imprisonment in a penitentiary is to be imposed. 
3. If the offender continues his military service within 
four weeks - in the field within one week - after the 
fact, imprisonment under article 1 can be imposed: 
in the case of article 2, imprisonment not less than 
six months is to be imposed. 52 
These articles allowed harsher penalties, and 
gave capital punishment more consideration. 
The Kriegssonderstrafrechts-verordnung 
(KSSVO). a special code of procedure in force 
101 
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during the war, further reinforced the latter. 
The greatest change, however, came with 
interpretation ofthe new regulations. German 
military judges, at the behest of superiors, 
consistently chose maximum penalties in 
decisions on desertion. During the last months 
of the war, most convictions for desertion and 
related offenses resulted in death sentences. 53 
Death, viewed by the German military as a 
deterrent, clearly became the norm for desertion 
in the dying gasps of the Third Reich. 
This trend was even more pronounced in 
the conduct of different service branches. 
Kriegsmarine judges and commanders 
enthusiastically surpassed Luftwaffe and Heer 
counterparts in distributing death sentences. 
On27 Aprill943, D6nitz, thenewcommander-
in-chief of the Kriegsmarine, had forsworn any 
pardons or remissions for naval desertion 
convictions, a policy previously endorsed by 
his predecessor, Gross admiral Erich Raeder. 54 
The German navy, perhaps the closest of the 
three armed services to the Nazi state, thereby 
demonstrated an institutional inclination 
towards enforcement of death penalties. 
Lenient verdicts were the exception in German 
naval courts. Seen in this perspective, the 
Dorfer and Beck judgement was almost 
inevitable. German military courts, based in a 
perversion of military law and legal practice, 
would certainly deliver death sentences on 
deserters if given the opportunity. 
An indifferent and perhaps naive Canadian 
military provided the opportunities. Formal 
German military tribunals were unthinkable 
without Canadian sanction. The war was over, 
Stacked German rifles. 
(Photo: Alex M. Stirton/NAC PA 151196} 
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Nazi Germany was defeated, and the Canadians 
occupied Holland. Why then did German 
military courts exist and function after 
Germany's surrender? International law clearly 
prohibited these judicial proceedings. Article 
44 of the 1929 Geneva Convention made 
prisoners of war "subject to the laws, 
regulations, and orders in force in the armies 
of the detaining Power. "55 Under this provision, 
German prisoners of war were no longer 
accountable to German military law, but rather 
responsible to Canadian military law. The field 
court martial of the Canadian army, comprised 
of not fewer than three officers, paralleled 
German courts in structure and organization. 56 
However, Canadian courts were very different 
in approach. Canadian military law remained 
firmly entrenched in inherited English 
constitutional suppositions: 
At the outset of their deliberations the court must 
remember that it is the principle of English law that 
the accused is presumed to be innocent until he is 
proved to be guilty, and that the burden of proof rests 
upon the prosecution. Unless, therefore. the guilt of 
the accused has been established beyond reasonable 
doubt, the accused must be acquitted. 57 
In this regard, soldiers retained the rights 
and responsibilities of citizens. Moreover, the 
Canadian armed forces treated military 
offenses, with the exception of murder, as 
matters of discipline. Under Canadian military 
law, punishment for desertion usually 
comprised three-ten years imprisonment; the 
British and Canadian governments chose to 
abandon most military death penalties a decade 
before the outbreak of the Second World War. 58 
Thus, the survival of German deserters hinged 
on the will of the Canadian military leadership 
to apply accepted Canadian military law. 
Foulkes, claiming ignorance of German military 
courts in Holland at the time, later quipped: "I 
personally was much more concerned then 
with the safety of Canadian soldiers and the 
welfare of Dutch civilians than with Germans. "59 
The determination was simply not there. 
The Canadian military belatedly attempted 
a remedy of the situation through legal means. 
On 15May 1945, 1stCanadianinfantryDivision 
informed 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade that 
"detailed instructions on discipline NOT yet 
received from 21 Army Group but understood 
to be enroute."60 Throughout this time, 
Canadian military units operated without clear 
guidance or instruction from above on the 
matter of German military courts. Finally, on 
17 May 1945, the headquarters of the First 
Canadian Army issued Allied Military Standing 
Order No. 153 and a revised Twenty-FirstArmy 
Group Administrative Instruction No. 97. 61 
The two directives established comprehensive 
guidelines for the maintenance of discipline 
and application of justice among surrendered 
German troops. Although steps in the right 
direction, both documents contained 
limitations. German field courts still 
maintained "internal discipline within their 
own forces under the supervision and control 
of the Allied Military Authorities."62 Thus, 
Order No. 153 and Instruction No. 97 did not 
suspend German military courts, but rather 
placed restrictions on these proceedings. 
Henceforth, German military judges and 
commanders required written permission from 
Canadian corps district commanders for any 
sentence over two years imprisonment. 
Additionally, German military courts possessed 
no jurisdiction, except with special 
authorization from the Canadian military 
government, "in respect of offences [sic] against 
the [German] Military Criminal Code committed 
in the course of military operations. "63 The 
Canadian military, interested in occupation 
and control, instead emphasized offenses 
committed after the German capitulation. 
Under article 27 of Instruction No. 97, the 
death penalty remained in place: "Sentences 
of death will be referred, through Military 
Government channels, to HQ 21 Army Group, 
for confirmation."64 In the Canadian view, 
German military courts and military law still 
served useful purposes. The two Allied edicts, 
however restricted in scope, proved too late for 
Dorfer and Beck. 
Execution 
T he final outcome of the factory court martial highlighted the vacuum of Canadian 
decision-making. Stein, upon the military 
court's closing verdict, immediately appealed 
to the Seaforth Highlanders for means to carry 
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Operation "Eclipse" in Action- Gennan troops march back to Gennany. 
out the prescribed death sentences. A 
flabbergasted Pierce telephoned higher 
authorities for direction. At 1030 hours on 13 
May 1945, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade 
forwarded information to 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division: 
German marines in Amsterdam have picked up some 
of their own deserters. They have been tried by 
military law and sentenced to be shot. May they do 
this. Passed to XXX Corps. Chief of Staff German 
Corps will make decision - passed to 2 Canadian 
Infantry Brigade. 65 
The question travelled no farther up the 
Canadian military hierarchy. Major-General 
Harry W. Foster, commanding officer of 1st 
Canadian Infantry Division, or a member of his 
staff declined responsibility for the entire 
affair. 66 Incredibly, Blaskowitz decided the 
104 
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eventual fate of Dorfer and Beck from his 
German headquarters. At 1315 hours, the 
XXX German Army Corps responded directly 
to 1st Canadian Infantry Division: 
Reference message about German MARINE deserters 
to be shot. We thank-you for advising us and Chief 
of Staff approves the sentence. We shall advise our 
Commander in Amsterdam accordingly. 2 [Canadian 
Infantry] Brigade Information. 67 
The German military, encouraged by Canadian 
apathy, seized a chance to exercise its rapidly 
declining authority. After advising the 
Canadians, the German staff informed Stein of 
Blaskowitz's approval through the German 
communication network. The process 
demonstrated the smooth cooperation 
established between Germans and Canadians 
in Holland. 
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The actual execution of Dorfer and Beck 
followed a similar pattern. At 1335 hours on 13 
May 1945, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade advised 
Mace and Pierce of the German decision by 
telephone: "German deserters will be shot, 
approved by German Chief of Staff. Have FSS 
personnel showed up yet? Answer: No."68 A 
written order from brigade headquarters later 
confirmed this verbal directive. The Germans 
and Canadians wanted the execution performed 
the same day of the trial although article 66 of 
the 1929 Geneva Convention insisted that all 
death sentences "shall not be executed before 
the expiration of a period of at least three 
months"9 after communication to the protecting 
Power. Pierce, ignorant of international law 
and blindly following faulty superior orders, 
arranged truck transport, and issued, from a 
locked room, eight German rifles with sixteen 
rounds of ammunition for the German firing 
squad. In these actions, the Canadian officer 
disregarded the moral imperative of 
disobedience. 70 Distribution of weapons 
bestowed informal Canadian permission for 
the execution. German officers, detailed by 
Stein, would choose the execution spot, and 
implement the death sentences. Fearful of 
trouble with the NBS, Pierce sent Swinton, his 
second-in-command, and a Sergeant-Major 
named Webster "to make sure that the Germans 
got back safely."71 At 1740 hours, the German 
firing squad shot Dorfer and Beck on the wall 
of an air raid shelter near the factory. When 
Pierce asked how the Germans could kill these 
two men on a beautiful day after the end of the 
war, Hoslinger replied: 'These boys have been 
(Photo: Atex M. Stirton/NAC PA 183227) 
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deserters, and if they were allowed to go home 
and have children the minds of the children 
would be dirty, too." 72 Despite defeat, codes of 
loyalty and honour persisted in the German 
military. Canadian officer and German officer 
stubbornly clung to common standards of 
military discipline. 
As stated previously, the execution ofDorfer 
and Beck was far from an exception. Later on 
13 May 1945, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade 
asked 1st Canadian Infantry Division for 
instructions on more German deserters: 
NBS have 12 more deserters found in jails in 
Rotterdam. What does German Chief of Staff want 
done with them. Are they to be shot as were others 
this morning. ANSWER: put in concentration camp 
Ijmuiden and turn over to camp commander General 
Huttner. 73 
The Canadians promptly repatriated these men 
to the German military. This action brought 
almost certain death. Lieutenant-Colonel A. 
Powis, the commander of a temporary Canadian 
occupation formation, revealed the end for 
some deserters: "A German sea commander 
came down to ask for ten rifles. He had some 
men he wanted to shoot. (The rifles were 
supplied [to] him.)"74 Unquestioning Canadian 
officers repeatedly acquiesced to German 
demands. Order and discipline overrode claims 
to justice. 
Nevertheless, general Canadian policy 
towards German deserters soon changed. On 
18 May 1945, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade 
reported "a Russian deserter from the German 
Army who had then apparently joined the NBS 
... whom they were loathe to give up to the 
Germans."75 Canadian units increasingly 
questioned repatriation of deserters who had 
clearly worked actively for the Allied cause in 
conjunction with resistance forces. In the view 
of many Canadian soldiers, surrender of these 
men to a loathsome German military 
establishment hardly seemed fair. The late 
implementation of Standing Order No. 153 and 
Instruction No. 97 salved many Canadian 
consciences. Eventually, the Canadian military 
followed a graduated policy towards deserters: 
106 
All the Germans who deserted after the armistice, 
were turned over to their respective units for 
disciplining. Germans who deserted some time ago, 
but were picked up after the armistice, were sent to 
the Corps PW Cage and passed back through the 
usual channels. A German who had deserted many 
months ago, who had got into civilian clothes and 
had done good work for the Dutch Underground 
must still be treated as a PW. 76 
Canadian military authorities, liberally granting 
prisoner of war status, assessed German 
deserters in terms of situation and usefulness 
to the Allies. The German military now received 
only a select number of deserters. On 22 May 
1945, the Seaforth Highlanders, the same 
regiment which had participated in the 
execution of Dorfer and Beck, showed a much 
more humane and realistic approach: 
During the morning, the NBS brought in another 
German deserter in civilian clothes and he was sent 
down to FSS to be dealt with through their channels. 
Nearly every day now for the last week we had been 
receiving and dispatching German deserters picked 
up in civilian clothes. 77 
Thus, time and attitudes worked against Dorfer 
and Beck; ironically, only a few days later, the 
Seaforth Highlanders regularly spared 
deserters. The ongoing departure of the 
Germans partly accounted for this change. 
Under the timetable of Operation "Eclipse," 
the evacuation of the German armed forces 
began in the latter half of May. At 0830 hours 
on 15 May 1945, "D" Company of the Seaforth 
Highlanders "started the movement ofthe 1800 
odd Marines from their camp to IJMUIDEN."78 
This local movement was preparatory for an 
even larger movement of the German armed 
forces from the Netherlands. On 19 May 1945, 
Blaskowitz, at the request ofFoulkes, submitted 
a detailed order of march for this purpose 
which concluded with an admonition for all 
German troops: "I expect every man to set up 
a model of discipline on the march and strictly 
demand to keep roads and transit camps 
ruthlessly clean."79 Under the direction of 
Blaskowitz, the German military completely 
planned the march of German military 
formations out ofWestern Holland. Canadian 
military authorities, fulfilling the role of 
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overseer, merely rubber-stamped German 
proposals. 80 Not surprisingly, the tremendous 
German effort proved a model of efficiency and 
organization. The Germans moved "in five 
large groups from the five concentration areas, 
mainly by land and on foot up to DEN HELDER 
Z0089 from thence by LCTs, barges, etc, across 
the ZUIDER ZEE to 2 Canadian corps area. "81 
Advance parties prepared transit camps for 
large staggered marching groups. At the same 
time, Canadian military authorities approved 
retention of a four-man court martial for a 
German pioneer brigade kept in the 
Netherlands. 82 This court continued to apply 
German military law, albeit limited by Canadian 
restrictions, among remaining German troops. 
Thus, the maintained German military 
structure and the unusual courts martial 
contributed to the larger goal of evacuation. 
The Canadians wanted the Germans out of the 
Netherlands as quickly as possible. 
In this sense, Dorfer and Beck were 
expendable pawns for larger political and 
strategic concerns. Canadian and British 
military authorities intended "to place all 
capitulated troops in 2 Canadian Corps area 
... NORTHoftheJADE-EMScanalwhichruns 
between WILHELMSHAVEN and EMDEN. 
Commencing 25 May, all capitulated troops in 
Holland will be moved into this area. "83 
In this coastal region of North-West 
Germany, Blaskowitz's formations joined 
recently arrived German troops from Denmark 
and Norway. Why were the Canadians and 
British so anxious to collect surrendered 
German troops in this area? The answer was 
largely twofold. Firstly, Allied victory over Nazi 
Germany produced rising Canadian public 
pressure to bring the boys home. Canadian 
political and military leaders desired a speedy 
withdrawal of the First Canadian Army from 
Europe. Already at the end of May, small drafts 
from the Seaforth Highlanders began leaving 
for England, and then Canada. 84 Larger groups 
followed in the coming months. At the same 
time, Canadian troops increasingly wore out 
their welcome in the Netherlands. Some Dutch 
people looked forward to a time "when the 
Canadians have disappeared back to Canada. "85 
A friendly liberation army still constituted an 
occupation army which prevented a return to 
normal everyday lives. Thus, the rapid removal 
of German troops remained a necessary 
precursor for an equally rapid departure of the 
Canadian army. 
Secondly, key British figures maintained 
secret plans for the enormous number of 
German prisoners of war. On 1 December 
1954, Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
clarified, in the British House of Commons, the 
situation at the end of the war: "No trouble 
could in any case have arisen with the Soviets 
unless they had continued their advance to a 
point at which they forced the breaking out of 
a new war between Russia and her Western 
allies ... we should certainly in that case rearm 
the German prisoners in our hands." 86 
Churchill and other important officials in the 
British govemment remained distrustful of 
Soviet intentions; again and again, the Russians 
appeared to disregard the terms of the Yalta 
Agreement. Thus, in Churchill's view, 
surrendered German troops, kept in existing 
German military formations, represented a 
safe card for the British position. In the event 
of new hostilities, vanquished German units 
and British military forces would have combined 
against an offensive RedArmy. 87 Thus, the two 
and half million German prisoners of war in 
Commonwealth hands represented a huge 
strategic reserve. Montgomery, directed by 
Churchill, gave "a "stand still" order regarding 
the destruction of German weapons and 
equipment, in case they might be needed by 
the Western Allies for any reason. "88 Canadian 
military formations, under the strategic 
command of Montgomery, shared in these 
arrangements. On 4 June 1945, the First 
Canadian Army directed Blaskowitz to 
reorganize and consolidate units within the 
Twenty-Fifth German Army.89 Nevertheless, 
as fears of a Russian advance receded and the 
Western Allies settled with Stalin at Potsdam 
in July 1945, the days of the maintained 
German military were numbered. Beginning 
in 1946, the Control Commission for Germany, 
British Element (CCG, BE) gradually 
demobilized the German armed forces in the 
British occupation zone. 90 German soldiers 
returned to shattered homes and broken 
dreams in post-war Germany. However, two 
sailors, buried in shallow graves on the outskirts 
of Amsterdam, never returned home. 
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Postscript 
T he aftermath of the Dorfer /Beck execution persisted beyond 1945. During 1948-49, 
the Western Allies combined their three 
occupation zones into the Federal Republic of 
West Germany.91 The new country adopted a 
constitutional government based on democratic 
forms. Understandably, West German 
governments distanced themselves from the 
Nazi past. Yet, anamazingamountofcontinuity 
existed between the new Bundesrepublik and 
the Third Reich. Embarrassing public 
disclosures periodically plagued politicians, 
judges, civil servants, military officers and 
other public figures of successive West German 
governments. 92 The West German press, 
reflecting contemporary German public 
opinion, zealously revealed former connections 
and involvement with the National Socialist 
regime. 
In this way, the wartime execution ofDorfer 
and Beck became an object of public and legal 
controversy in West Germany. On 12 
September 1966, the investigative Hamburg 
magazine Der Spiegel broke the story based on 
several interviews and cursory research. 93 
Relatives of Dorfer and Beck finally discovered 
the cruel fate of their missing brethren. A short 
time later, Beck's surviving sister, Berthilde, 
launched a civil suit against Kahn, now a 
supreme court judge in Cologne, for the murder 
of her brother; Kahn, in his defence, blamed 
unnamed Canadian military officers for the 
execution. 94 The case, eventually unsuccessful 
for lack of witnesses, had months before 
attracted the notice ofthe European press and 
government officials. Richard Bower, the 
Canadian ambassador in Bonn, dismissed the 
entire controversy as a "tempest in a teacup."95 
Bower's cheeky comment, later retracted, 
reflected a poor beginning on the Canadian 
side. 
The response of the Canadian government 
on the other side of the Atlantic was equally 
disappointing. On 23 September 1966, Edward 
McWhinney, then director ofMcGill University's 
Institute of Air and Space Law in contact with 
108 
Professor Ernst Friesenhahan in Heidelberg, 
brought the Dorfer /Beck execution to the 
attention of Paul Hellyer, Minister of National 
Defence in the Lester Pearson government. 96 
The timing was important for Hellyer; the 
besieged minister was receiving considerable 
criticism over a recent scrapping of nine 
Canadian warships and Liberal plans for a 
unification of the Canadian military. The 
Conservative opposition, led by John 
Diefenbaker, quickly seized upon the Dorfer j 
Beck controversy as a chip in this larger political 
game. On 7 October 1966, Hellyer, in an 
explanatory speech to the House of Commons, 
concluded that "allegations contained in Der 
Spiegel are completely without foundation. "97 
However, Hellyer's assurances remained short-
lived. 
Canadian newspapers, after interviews with 
former Canadian officers and other witnesses, 
presented strong evidence of active Canadian 
participation in the execution. Consequently, 
Brigadier William J. Lawson, then Judge 
Advocate General, appointed Group Captain 
J.H. Hollies to undertake a full departmental 
investigation. 98 This military legal officer 
searched relevant Canadian documents, and 
made a three-day whirlwind trip to West 
Germany. Based on Hollies' findings, an 
embarrassed Hellyer confirmed, in the House 
of Commons on 21 December 1966, Canadian 
involvement in the execution, but suggested 
"that in view of the fact it is now over 20 years 
since the war ended, nothing is to be gained by 
carrying this matter further. "99 With this final 
statement, Canadian officials closed the public 
file on Dorfer and Beck. Legal recommendations 
that the Canadian government accept at least 
partial responsibility for the execution and 
furnish all possible aid to West German 
prosecution efforts remained unfulfilled. In a 
letter to McWhinney on 21 December 1966, 
Hellyer dismissed the notion "that I or any 
member of the [Canadian] Government may, 
with propriety, suggest to another state what 
legal action it should take where no offence is 
alleged to have been committed against a 
Canadian national. "100 After several months of 
debate, the contentious execution fell from the 
public eye. 
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Conclusion 
T he execution of Bruno Dorfer and Rainer Beck by surrendered German troops in 
Canadian custody was a product of many 
factors. Under a dubious interpretation of 
intemationallaw, Canadian military authorities 
permitted a continuation of the German military 
structure after the demise of the Third Reich. 
German assistance was indispensable in the 
disarmament, concentration, and evacuation 
of the German armed forces within Holland. 
Unfortunately, disinterested Canadian military 
authorities also left the German military in 
control of order and discipline. German 
commanders and military judges applied a 
military law warped by National Socialism. 
The Canadian military, distracted by larger 
political and strategic concerns, tardily 
instituted restrictions on these proceedings. 
Dorfer and Beck, seeking safety and friends, 
instead found indifference and enemies. Were 
the deaths ofDorfer and Beck avoidable? Yes! 
Indeed, it is hard to understand why Canadian 
military authorities did not follow, from their 
first arrival in Amsterdam, the graduated policy 
eventually adopted towards German deserters. 
In the case ofDorfer and Beck, only one strong 
voice along the Canadian or German military 
hierarchies was needed to question the irony of 
the situation. Disappointingly, none was 
present. 
Many of the original quotations in this article 
contain abbreviations and acronyms which have 
been spelled- outfor this article. 
The Editor 
NOTES 
1. Swinton died later in an accident in Germany. Toronto 
Daily Star, 24 October 1966, p.92. The Italian-
Yugoslav film Gott mit Uns (released in Canada on 24 
January 1974 as The Firing Squad) provides a 
dramatized and somewhat inaccurate portrayal of 
events. This movie, directed by Giuliano Montaldi. is 
available on video under the title The Fifth Day of 
Peace. Directorate of History, Department of National 
Defence (DHist) 112.3Hl.003 (D31), Film Review: 
"The Firing Squad" by Philip Chaplin, 28 January 
1974. Gott mit Uns debuted at the Cannes Film 
Festival between 2-16 May 1970. InApril1970, the 
Canadian government considered suppressing the 
film. DHist 81/669, Documents released to the 
author under the Canadian Access to Information 
Act. 2. W.A.B. Douglas and Brereton Greenhous, 
Out of the Shadows: Canada in the Second World 
War. Oxford University Press, 1977, p.216. Jeffery 
Williams, The Long Left Flank: The Hard Fought Way 
to the Reich, 1944-1945, Leo Cooper. 1988, p.281. 
C.P. Stacey. TheCanadianArmy 1939-1945, Edmond 
Cloutier, King's Printer, 1948, p.269. 
3. Erich Maschke, eds., Zur Geschichte der deutschen 
Kriegsgefangenen des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Verlag 
Ernst und Werner Gieseking, 1974, Xl/1: Hermann 
Wolff. Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in britischer 
Hand. s.79. 
4. Milton Shulman, De;.feat in the West. Ballantine Books, 
1968 (1947), p.379. 
5. C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, Volume III, Offtcial 
History of the Canadian Army in the Second World 
War, Queen's Printer, 1960, p.608. Terry Copp and 
Robert Vogel, Maple Leaf Route: Victory, Maple Leaf 
Route. 1988, p.120. Norman Phillips and J. Nikerk, 
Holland and the Canadians, Contact Publishing Co .. 
[n.d.], p.16. 
6. Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-
Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G., 
Collins, 1958, p.339. John North, North-West Europe 
1944-5, HMSO, 1953, pp.237-239. Richard S. 
Malone, MissingfromtheRecorcL Collins, 1946, p.l23. 
7. NationalArchivesofCanada(NAC), RG24, Vol. 10799, 
File 225C2.012 (D4), Directive, General Crerar to 
Blaskowitz, 6 May 1945. Fred Whitcombe and Blair 
Gilmour, The Pictorial History of Canada's Army 
Overseas, 1939-1945, Whitcombe, Gilmour and Co .. 
1947, pp.260-262. 
8. NAC, RG24, Vol. 15258, War Diary (WD), Seaforth 
Highlanders of Canada, 7 May 1945. 
9. Reginald H. Roy, The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada 
1919-1965, Evergreen Press. 1969, p.439. 
10. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10895, File 235Cl.Oll (D2). "The 
Concentration, Disarming, and Evacuation of 
Germans in Western Holland, As Seen at Divisional 
Level," Interview with Lt.-Col. W.S. Murdoch, 7 June 
1945. David Kaufman and Michie! Horn, A Liberation 
Album: Canadians in the Netherlands 1944-45, 
McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Ltd., 1980, p.92. 
11. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10799, File 225C2.012 (D4), I 
Canadian Corps Surrender Order No. 2, Lt.-Gen. 
Foulkes to Blaskowitz, 6 May 1945. 
12. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10896, File 235Cl.013 (D4), "Report 
1st Canadian Infantry Division for Week Ending 12 
May 1945," Capt. T.J. Allan, 13 May 1945. Michie! 
Horn, "More than Cigarettes, Sex and Chocolate: The 
Canadian Army in the Netherlands, 1944-1945," 
Journal of Canadian Studies 16 (Fall-Winter 1981): 
p.159. 
13. DHist 112.3Hl.003 (D31). Extract, WD 4th 
Reconnaissance Regiment (4 PLDG), 10 May 1945. 
14. NAC, RG24, Vol. 15258, WD, Seaforth Highlanders, 
11 May 1945. The Third Troop of the Fourth 
Reconnaissance Regiment assisted "D" Company at 
the Ford factory. DHist 112.3Hl.003 (D31), Extract, 




Madsen: Victims of Circumstance: the Execution of German Deserters by Sur
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993
15. Montgomery, p.345. 
16. DHist 322.009 (Dl37), "Historical Summary, Seaforth 
Highlanders, Canadian Army 1939-45," 8September 
1945. 
17. DHist 145.2H1011 (Dl), "AspectsinfantryBattallion's 
Activities in Western Holland First Weeks of"Eclipse, "" 
Interview with Lt.-Col. G.E.B. Renison, 2 June 1945. 
18. DHist 142.5M2011 (Dl), "Concentration and 
Evacuation of Germans at Den Helder," 8 May-10 
June 1945, Major J.G. Osler, 12 June 1945. 
19. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10610, File 215Cl.009 (D20), DDOS 
First Canadian Army Eclipse Instruction No. 10, 
Brig. D.G.J. Farquhrson, 17 May 1945. Canadian 
military authorities allowed German officers and 
military police to retain personal weapons. DHist 
142.1109 (D2). Message 071520, 1st Canadian 
Infantry Division to All Units, 7 May 1945. 
20. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File 215Cl.009 (23). "List 
and Description of Enemy War Material Dumps in 
2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade Area," 15 May 1945. 
This job was sometimes hazardous. On 20 May 
1945, an accidental explosion of250 tons of German 
ammunition on the island of Dutten killed seven 
Canadian soldiers. DHist 142.31011 (D1). "CRA 
Group in Surrender Operation, 8 May - 8 June 
1945," Interview with Capt. J.M. Church. 
21. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File215Cl.009 (D33). Memo. 
EXFOR Rear to Administrative HQ First Canadian 
Army, 9 May 1945. 
22. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10963, File 260C2.009 (D32). 
"Quarterly Report 1st Canadian Infantry Division 1 
April/ 30 June 1945," ADMS 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division, p.1 7. DHist 145.2N 1009 (D2). "1st Canadian 
Army and 21st Army Group Instructions Operation 
"Eclipse,"" April 1945. Alan Moorehead, Eclipse, 
Hamish Hamilton. 1945, p.230. 
23. NAC, RG24, Reel C-5342, Memo. Secretary of State 
Dominion Affairs to Secretary of State External Affairs, 
2 May 1945. James Bacque, Other Losses, Stoddart, 
1989, p.28. The author does not agree with many of 
Bacque's conclusions. Unfortunately, few books 
deal directly with the Allied use of "Surrendered 
Enemy Personnel" and "Disarmed Enemy Personnel" 
labels for German prisoners of war in North-West 
Europe after the Second World War. 
24. Howard S. Levie, eds., Documents on Prisoners of 
War, Volume 60, International Law Studies, Naval 
War College Press, 1979, p.1 78. Eleanor C. Flynn. 
"The Geneva Convention on Treatment of Prisoners 
of War," George Washington Law Review 11(1942-
43): p.508. 
25. Canadian Red Cross Archives, Box ICRC-History-
WWII-POW- Medical Commission, Rene-Jean 
Wilhelm, "Can the Status of Prisoners of War be 
Altered?" International Committee of the Red Cross, 
1953, pp.5-8. R.C. Hingorani, Prisoners of War, 
Oceana Publications, 1982, p.34. 
26. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10799. File 225C2.012 (D4). Memo. 
Major-Gen. IC Administration 21st Army Group to 
GOC C. First Canadian Army, 8 March 1945. 
2 7. Peter Padfield, D6nitz: The Last FUhrer, Victor Gollancz 
Ltd., 1984, p.433. Walter Ludde-Neurath, Regierung: 
die Letzten Tage des DrittenReiches, Druffel-Verlag, 
110 
1980, s.161. Mar lis G. Steinert, "The Allied Decision 
to Arrest the Donitz Government," The Historical 
Jouma131(1988): p.661. 
28. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10799, File 225C2.012 (D4). 
!Canadian Corps Operational Instruction No. 50, 10 
May 1945. 
29. DHist 144.131011 (D1). "Surrender May 1945, 1st 
Canadian Infantry Division Signals," General Note 
by Lt.-Col. B.W. Grover. DHist 142.1109 (D2). Lt.-
Col. B.W. Grover to HQ German 30th Corps, 13 May 
1945. 
30. NAC, RG24, Vol. 13732, WD, 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division, Message 3706, I Canadian Corps to 1st 
Canadian Infantry Division, 1000 hours, 11 May 
1945. 
31. Walter Lohmann and Hans H. Hildebrand, Die 
Deutsche Kriegsmarine 1939-1945, Band II, Podzun-
Verlag, 1956-1964, 132, s.9. 
32. M.I. Gurfein and Morris Janowitz, "Trends in 
Wehrmacht Morale," Public Opinion Quarterly 
10(1946), p.78. Edward A. ShilsandMorrisJanowitz, 
"Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in 
World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly 12(1948): 
pp.312-313. 
33. Johannes Steinhoff. Peter Pechel, and Dennis 
Showalter, Voices from the Third Reich: An Oral 
History, Regnery Gateway, 1989, p.254. James M. 
Erdmann, Leajlet Operations in the Second World 
War, Denver Instant Printing, 1969. 
34. Otto Hennicke, "Auszuge aus der 
Wehrmachtkriminal-statistik," Zeitschrift fur 
Militiirgeschichte 5(1966): s.449. Because records 
after this date are incomplete, the number of German 
soldiers sacrificed during the "Justice Terror" in the 
last months of the war is unknown. Recent German 
research suggests 35,000 desertion convictions 
(22,750 death sentences) during the entire war. 
Manfred Messerschmidt and Fritz Wullner, Die 
Wehrmachtsjustiz imDienste des Nationalsozialismus 
Zerstorung einer Legende, N amos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987, s.91. 
35. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10717, File 215Cl.98 (405). Lt.-Col. 
H.V. Dicks, "THE GERMAN DESERTER: A 
Psychological Study," Director Army Psychological 
Department Memo., 9 March 1945. 
36. Clifton D. Bryant, Khaki-Collar Crime: Deviant 
Behaviour in the Military Context, Collier, 1979, p.163. 
37. DHist 142.1109 (D2). Receipt 1st Canadian AGRA 
H.Q., 15 May 1945. 
38. NAC, RG24, Vol. 13732, WD, 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division, 13 May 1945. An altered version of this 
extract is reproduced in Tony Foster, Meeting of 
Generals, Methuen, 1986, p.445. 
39. L.B. Schapiro, "Repatriation of Deserters," British 
Yearbook of International Law 29(1952). p.31l. 
Hingorani, pp.31-32. 
40. "Kriegsgerichte: Menschlich bedruckend,2bonn" Der 
Spiegel38 ( 12 September 1966): s. 58-61. In February 
1935, Fredegund Beck, an active member of the 
German Resistance Movement, and her fiance, Dr. 
Carl Richartz, had fled from the Gestapo in Berlin. 
DHist 81/669, Memo, J.H. Hollies to Parliamentary 
Returns, 16 June 1967. 
18
Canadian Military History, Vol. 2 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol2/iss1/8
41. A sympathetic Gestapo officer, who had served under 
the elder Beck as a young policeman, prevented Elsa 
Beck's shipment to Auschwitz by delaying an official 
summons. DHist 81/669, Memo, J.H. Hollies to 
Parliamentary Returns, 16 June 1967. 
42. DHist 81/669, Memo, J.H. Hollies to Parliamentary 
Returns, 16 June 1967. 
43. Toronto Daily Star, 22 October 1966, p.9. 
44. Toronto Daily Star, 25 October 1966, p.7. 
45. DHist 112.3Hl.009 (D182), "Notes on questions by 
German magazine DER SPIEGEL from Military 
Attache Bonn," 30 August 1966. 
46. Toronto Daily Star, 25 October 1966, p.7. 
47. NAC, RG24, Vol. 15258, WD, Seaforth Highlanders, 
13 May 1945. 
48. The Globe and Mail, 28 October 1966, p.29. In 1967, 
an unremorseful Stein defended his actions: "Beck 
would never have been a credit to Germany anyway. 
Deserters only turn into criminals in civil life too." 
DHist 81/669, Memo, J.H. Hollies to Parliamentary 
Returns, 16 June 1967. 
49. Leslie C. Green, Essays on the Modern Law of War, 
Transnational Publishers, 1985, p.266. "Der Kerl 
gehartgehangt!" DerSpiegel28(10July 1978): s.36-
49. "Ein Menschenleben gilt fiir nix," Der Spiegel 
43(19 October 1987): s.ll2-128. Ironically, the 
German armed forces always considered itself a very 
law-abiding institution. Geoffrey Best, "World War II 
and the law of war," Review of International Studies 
7(1981): p.73. 
50. Manfred Messerschmidt, 'TheWehrmachtandVolks-
gemeinschaft," Journal of Contemporary History 
18(1983): p.734. Manfred Messerschmidt, "German 
Military Law in the Second World War," Wilhelm 
Deist, eds., The German Military in the Age of Total 
War, Berg, 1985, p.327. 
51. Messerschmidt and Wiillner, s.90. Messerschmidt, 
"German Military Law," p.325. Otto Peter Schweling, 
Die deutsche Militcirjustiz in der Zeit des 
Nationalsozialismus, N.G. Elwert Verlag Marburg, 
1977, s.129. 
52. Translation by the author. Franz W. Seidler, "Die 
Fahnenflucht in der deutschen Wehrmacht wahrend 
des Zweiten Weltkrieges," Militcirgeschichtliche 
Mitteilungen 2(1977): s.24. Schweling, s.28. 
53. Otto Hennicke, "Uber den Justizterror in der 
deutschen Wehrmacht am Ende des Zweiten 
Weltkrieges," Zeitschrift Fiir Militcirgeschichte4( 1965): 
s. 720. Joachim Philipp, "Der Gerichtsherr in der 
deutschen MiliUi.rgerichtsbarkeit bis 1945," 
Militcirgeschichte 27(1988): s.546. Heinz Hiirten, 
"Im Umbruch der Normen: Dokumente iiber die 
deutsche Militarjustiz nach der Kapitulation der 
Wehrmacht," Militcirgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 
2(1980): s.l37-l56 provides a good collection of 
documents on the operation of German military 
courts in Norway after the capitulation. 
54. Lothar Gruchmann, "Ausgewahlte Documente zur 
deutschen Marinejustiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg," 
Vierteijahrsheftefiir Zeitgeschichte 26(1978): s.469. 
Seidler, s.33. "So etwas unterschreibt man nicht 
einfach," DerSpeigel43(3 November 1965): s.69-79. 
Anthony K. Martienssen, Hitler and His Admirals, 
E.P.DuttonandCo., 1949, pp.l56-159. Raederand 
D6nitz, shaken by their experiences at Nuremburg 
and Spandau, characteristically ignored the subject 
in post-war memoirs. Erich Raeder, My Life, United 
States Naval Institute, 1960. Karl Donitz, Memoirs: 
Ten years and Twenty days, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1959. 
55. Levie, Documents, p.187. A.J. Barker, "Number, 
Rank and Name!" Military Review 55(1975): p.46. 
Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War in International 
Armed Conflict, Volume 59, International Law Studies, 
1978, p.336ff. W.J. Fenrick, "The Prosecution ofWar 
Criminals in Canada," Dalhousie Law Journal 
12(1989): p.286. 
56. Burrell M. Singer and R.J.S. Langford, Handbook of 
Canadian Military Law, The Copp Clark Co. Ltd., 
1941, p.76. DHist lB. Lt.-Col. T.M. Hunter, "Report 
No.9l: Some Aspects of Disciplinary Policy in the 
Canadian Services, 1914-1946," l5July 1960, pp.72-
73. 
57. Great Britain, Extracts from Manual of Military Law 
1929: reprinted for use in the Canadian Army, Edmond 
Cloutier, King's Printer, 1943, p.58. DHist 89/446, 
Brooke Claxton, Notes on Military Law and Discipline 
for Canadian Soldiers, 6 November 1939. Bernard 
Starkman, "Canadian Military Law: The Citizen as 
Soldier," Canadian Bar Review 43(1965): p.414. 
58. Clarence Richard Young, Notes on Elementary Military 
Law for Canadian Officers, University of Toronto 
Press, 1939, p.56. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10825, File 
229.C1 (D4), "Discipline, Canadian-Desertion," Lt.-
Gen. Foulkes, 4 April 1945. DHist 81/166, Digest 
Opinions and Rulings, Ottawa, 31 March 1944-
compiled records OfficeJudgeAdvocate-General DND 
HQ. William Moore, TheThinYellowLine, Leo Cooper 
Ltd., 1974, p.225. C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and 
Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-
1945, Queen's Printer, 1970, p.25l. 
59. Toronto Daily Star, 22 October 1966, p.9. 
60. NAC, RG24, Vol. 13743, WD,AQBranch 1st Canadian 
Infantry Division, 15 May 1945. 
61. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File 215.Cl009 (D33), 
"Discipline Disarmed Wehrmacht (excl.PW)." 
Adminstrative HQ First Canadian Army, 17 May 
1945. 
62. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File215.Cl.009 (D33), 21st 
Army Group Administrative Instruction No.97, 17 
May 1945. 
63. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File 215Cl.009 (D33), 
"Standing Orders Breaches of Discipline," 
Administrative HQ First Canadian Army, 25 May 
1945. 
64. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File 215.Cl009 (D33), 21st 
Army Group Administrative Instruction No.97, 17 
May 1945. 
65. NAC, RG24, Vol. 13732, WD, lst Canadian Infantry 
Division, Message 3873, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade 
to lst Canadian Infantry Division, 1030 hours, 13 
May 1945. Stein also sent a staff officer to Mace and 
Bell-Irving with a formal request for rifles. Bell-
Irving, leaving for England that morning, answered: 
"No - Don't be a damn fool -The war is over! Please 
convey those sentiments to your Commander." Letter, 
H.P. Bell-Irving to author, 26 June 1992. 
111 
19
Madsen: Victims of Circumstance: the Execution of German Deserters by Sur
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993
66. DHist 000.9 (Dl43), "List Commanders and 
Commanding Officers Canadian Army Units 
Liberation of Netherlands, October 1944 to May 
1945." 
67. NAC, RG24, Vol. 13732, WD, lst Canadian Infantry 
Division, Message 3890, German XXX Corps to lst 
Canadian Infantry Division, 1315 hours, 13 May 
1945. Blaskowitz, one of Hitler's fanatic defence 
generals, held a consistent dislike for deserters. On 
5 March 1945, during the retreat from the Western 
Allies, an unsympathetic Blaskowitz ordered death 
for all stragglers: "As from midday 10 March, all 
soldiers in all branches of the Wehrmacht who may 
be encountered away from their units on roads or in 
villages, in supply columns or among groups of 
civilian refugees, or in dressing-stations when not 
wounded, and who announce that they are stragglers 
looking for their units, will be summarily tried and 
shot." Shulman, pp.349-350. 
68. DHist ll2.3Hl.009 (Dl82). "Notes on questions by 
German magazine DER SPIEGEL from Military 
Attache, Bonn, through DGI/FLO," 30August 1966. 
69. Levie, Documents, p.l9l. 
70. Leslie C. Green, International Law: A Canadian 
Perspective, Carswell, 1984, pp.279-280. The 
Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal dismissed the 
defence of superior orders: "A soldier is a reasoning 
agent. He does not respond, and is not expected to 
respond like a piece of machinery ... To plead superior 
orders one must show an excusable ignorance of 
their illegality." George F.G. Stanley, "Obedience To 
Whom? To What?" Edgar Denton III, eds., Limits of 
Loyalty, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980, p.l 0. 
David Hughes-Morgan, "Disobedience to a Lawful 
Military Command," MilitaryReview57(1977): p.74. 
71. Toronto Daily Star, 25 October 1966, p.7. Webster 
was "said to have been sick at his stomach from 
having seen the execution take place." DHist 81/ 
669, Memo, J.H. Hollies to Brig. W.J. Lawson, 26 
October 1966. 
72. DHist ll2.3Hl.003 (D3l), Interview with Dennis 
Pierce by Group Captain J.H. Hollies, 9 October 
1966. Jay Baird, To Die for Germany: Heroes in the 
NaziPantheon, Indiana University Press, 1990, p.228. 
Geoffrey Best, Honour Among Men and Nations, 
University ofToronto Press, 1981, p.65. In 1966, an 
apologetic Pierce also justified the event: "We tried to 
stop it, believe me, but there was nothing we could do 
... they were soldiers- we all were." The Vancouver 
Sun, 22 October 1966, pp.l-2. 
73. NAC, RG24, Vol. 13732, WD, lst Canadian Infantry 
Division, Message 3943, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade 
to lst Canadian Infantry Division, 2355 hours, 13 
May 1945. 
74. DHist l42.5M20ll (Dl), "Commander"PowisForce" 
first month of "Eclipse,'"' Interview with Lt.-Col. A. 
Powis, 12 June 1945. A war diary entry described 
similar actions in the Eleventh Armoured Regiment 
(The Ontario Regiment): "Several German deserters 
showed up at 1400 hours. All deserters from the 
German Army are handled by the Germans 
themselves." DHist8l/669, Memo, S.F. Wise toJ.H. 
Hollies, 16 November 1966. 
112 
75. NAC, RG24, Vol. 13732, WD, lst Canadian Infantry 
Division, 18 May 1945. Canadian military authorities 
later refrained from despatching this deserter, a 
person named Urmanow, back to Germany. NAC, 
RG24, Vol. 10967, File 260C3.009 (D6). Memo., 
Major J.M. Gray, 9 June 1945. 
76. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10895, File 235Cl.Oll (Dl). 
"Surrender Arrangements, 5 May-8 June 1945, 
Divisional Point of View," Interview with Capt. D.G.E. 
Molnar, 8 June 1945. Feldwebel Arthur Bessel, a 
German deserter originally from the Sudetenland, 
fell into the second category. DHist 142.11009 (D2), 
Memo., lst Canadian AGRA, 17 May 1945. 
77. NAC, RG24, Vol. 15258, WD, Seaforth Highlanders, 
22 May 1945. 
78. NAC, RG24, Vol. 15258, WD, Seaforth Highlanders, 
15 May 1945. 
79. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File 215Cl.009 (D44). 
"Approval Order of March," Lt. -Gen. Foulkes to 
Blaskowitz. 21 May 1945. 
80. Sir Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory, Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1963, p.367. Stacey, Victory 
Campaign, p.615. 
81. NAC,RG24,Vol.l0896,File235Cl.Ol3(D4). "Report. 
l st Canadian Infantry Division Week Ending 26 May 
1945," Prepared by Capt. T.J. Allen, 27 May 1945. 
82. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10967, File 260C3.009 (D6), Request, 
XXX German Army Corps to lst Canadian Infantry 
Division, Initialled by 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade, 
24 May 1945. German pioneer and engineering units 
performed reconstruction work and cleared minefields 
in the Netherlands after the departure of the main 
German body. Maschke, XII: Hermann Jung, Die 
deutschen Kriegsgejangenenen im Gewahrsam 
Belgiens, der Niederlande und Luxemburgs, s.l83. 
Gerhard von Ledebur, "Die Raumung in den 
Gewassern von Nord-, West- und Osteuropa nach 
1945," Marine Rundschau 67(1970): s.273-282. 
83. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File 215Cl.009 (D33), 2nd 
Canadian Infantry Division, Eclipse Instruction No.1, 
l5May 1945. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10610, File215Cl.009 
(Dl5), "lst Canadian Army- Holland, Situational 
Maps- "Eclipse," May 1945. 
84. Roy. p.442. 
85. Horn, p.l68. 
86. RobertRhodesJames, eds., WinstonS. Churchill: His 
Complete Speeches 1897-1963, Volume VIII, Chelsea 
House Publishers, 1974, p.8619. 
87. Arthur L. Smith, Jr., Churchill's German Army: 
Wartime Strategy and Cold War Politics, 1943-1947, 
Volume 54, Sage Library of Social Research, Sage, 
1977, p. 79. Arthur L. Smith, Jr., "Churchill et 
L'Armee Allemande (1945)." Revue d'Histoire de la 
deuxieme Guerre 93(January 1974): p.72. 
88. Montgomery, p.359. Winston S. Churchill, Triumph 
and Tragedy, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953, p.574. 
89. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File 215Cl.009 (D33). Order, 
First Canadian Army to Commander Twenty-Fifth 
German Army, 4 June 1945. Although Canada 
participated (perhaps unwittingly) in British 
preparations, the likelihood of Canada actually going 
to war with the Soviet Union, an erstwhile ally, was 
very remote. During this time, Canada increasingly 
20
Canadian Military History, Vol. 2 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol2/iss1/8
sided with the more moderate Americans in political 
and diplomatic discussions. Denis Smith. Diplomacy 
of Fear: Canada and the Cold War 1941-1948, 
University of Toronto Press, 1988, p.84. Donald 
Page, "Getting to Know the Russians- 1943-1948," 
Aloysius Balawyder, eds., Canada-Soviet Relations 
1939-1980, Mosaic Press, 1981, p.23. 
90. Arthur Lee Smith, Jr., Heimkehr aus dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg: die Entlassung der deutschen 
Kriegsgefangenen, Nummer 51, Schriftenreihe der 
Vierte!jahrsheftefrlr Zeitgeschichte, Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1985, s.4l-42. 
91. V.R. Berghahn, Modem Germany: Society, economy 
and politics in the twentieth century, Cambridge 
University Press, 1982, p.199. 
92. Globe and Mail, 18 October 1966, p.7. Skeletons in 
the closet haunted many personages in West German 
governments. "Zwei W orter," Der Spiegel5(24 J anuar 
1966): s.41-42. "Das ist es, was mich plagt," Der 
Spiegel40(26 September 1966): s.38-4l. "Er hat die 
Manneszuchtzersetzt," DerSpiegel11(10Aprill972): 
s.49. "Idee vom Eckpfeiler," Der Spiegel32(3l Juli 
1972): s.40-4l. "Letzte Lektion," Der Spiegel39(24 
September 1979): s.5l-52. 
93. "Kriegsgerichte: Menschlich bednlckend," Der Spiegel 
38(12 September 1966): s.58-61. The Canadian 
Department of National Defence knew of the incident 
before the article was published. In July 1966, Der 
Spiegel had requested information on the execution 
from Colonel A.S.A Galloway. the Canadian Military 
Attache in Bonn. DHist ll2.3H1.003 (D3l). Letter, 
Col. A.S.A. Galloway to Director General of 
Intelligence, Ottawa, 18 July 1966. 
94. Toronto Daily Star, 24 October 1966, p.92. The Globe 
and Mail, 24 October 1966, p.l2. DHist 81/669, 
Memo, DND to Parliamentary Returns, 12 October 
1966. 
95. The Globe and Mail, 4 November 1966, p. 7. Captain 
John Bewis, the senior legal officer of the Canadian 
armed forces in Europe, agreed with Bower's 
appraisal. The Vancouver Sun, 27 October 1966, 
p.4l. 
96. Interview with Professor Edward McWhinney, Simon 
Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, 14 
May 1992. DHist 81/669, Letter, McWhinney to 
Hellyer, 23 September 1966. 
97. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 
1966, Volume VIII, lst Session, 27th Parliament, 7 
October 1966, p.8510. 
98. The Globe and Mail, 26 October 1966, p.lO. The 
Globe and Mail, 28 October 1966, p.l. DHist 181.009 
(D30), "Judge Advocate General." R.A. McDonald, 
"The Legal Branch Law Firm of the Canadian Forces," 
Canadian Forces JAG Joumal2(1987): p.3. 
99. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 
1966, Volume XI, lst Session, 27th Parliament, 21 
December 1966, p.11446. International Law 
Association, eds., The Canadian Yearbook of 
International Law, The University of British Columbia, 
1968, p.325. 
100.DHist 81/669, Letter, Hellyer to McWhinney, 21 
December 1966. On 8 March 1967, the German 
Embassy formally requested, through a diplomatic 
note to the Department ofExtemalAffairs, information 
for Cologne Public Prosecutor Christoph Vonderbank. 
DHist 81/669, Letter, Group Captain William M. Lee 
to McWhinney, 11 July 1967. The West Germans 
only interviewed one Canadian witness. On 24 
November 1967, Pierce provided evidence at the 
German Consulate in Vancouver. DHist 81/669, 
Memo, W.J. Lawson, 21 November 1967. 
Chris Madsen is a doctoral student at the 
University of Victoria. 
113 
21
Madsen: Victims of Circumstance: the Execution of German Deserters by Sur
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993
